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Abstract— Over the past two decades, financial market crises
with similar features have occurred in different regions of
the world. Unstable cross-market linkages during financial
crises are referred to as financial contagion. We simulate the
transmission of financial crises in the context of a model of
market participants adopting various strategies; this allows
testing for financial contagion under alternative scenarios.
Using a minority game approach, we develop an agent-based
multinational model and investigate the reasons for contagion.
Although contagion has been extensively investigated in the
financial literature, it has not been studied yet through compu-
tational intelligence techniques. Our simulations shed light on
parameter values and characteristics which can be exploited to
detect contagion at an earlier stage, hence recognising financial
crises with the potential to destabilise cross-market linkages. In
the real world, such information would be extremely valuable
to develop appropriate risk management strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crises which occurred in Mexico in 1987,
in Asia in 1997, and in Russia in 1998, all spread from
one country to neighbouring economies in the region - a
phenomenon referred to as ‘financial contagion’. Forbes and
Rigobon [1] provide a more precise definition, describing
contagion as a significant increase in cross-market linkages
after a shock to a group of countries. “Interdependence”
instead applies to a situation when two markets exhibit a
high degree of co-movement during both stability periods
and crisis periods [2]. Many studies using simulation and
forecasting techniques or developing early warning systems
focus on the origins of financial crisis [4]-[6] rather than
financial contagion. More recent works [1]-[3] have instead
analysed either contagion or interdependence. In this paper,
we simulate the transmission of financial crises modelling
the behaviour of market participants and their various strate-
gies using a mixed-game agent-based approach. Ours is a
multinational framework which is suitable for the analysis
of financial contagion.
Herd behaviour has been identified as a major factor
behind contagion. This arises because of irrational investment
choices made by noise traders [7][8]. Agent-based models
are an effective tool to describe and simulate such behaviour
[9]. Experiments show that the presence of noise traders
increases price fluctuations. Agent-based models may be
further employed to simulate linked markets rather than a
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single market. For example, international financial crises
are studied in Kaizoji [10] investigating correlated markets.
Each market has a certain number of participants, where
the proportion of participants with an attitude to buy/sell in
each market is determined by the average domestic attitudes,
average foreign attitudes and global fundamentals. Thus the
model is able to simulate interdependence, when a shock
to one of the markets is followed by a fall in the related
market. By introducing noise traders as well, it is possible
to simulated contagion during a financial crisis [11].
An effective framework for studying more realistic and
complex markets is provided by Game Theory, the Minority
Game approach being particularly influential [12]. Jefferies
et al. [13] build on it and develop Grand Canonical games,
using that approach in a multi-agent game model to predict
future movements in financial time-series [14]. Improved
forecasting accuracy is achieved by adding majority game
agents who play together with minority game agents in
a mixed-game model [15]. It appears that using a mixed-
game approach improves forecasting accuracy by at least 3%
compared to a minority game approach. In this paper, we
further develop the mixed-game model into a mixed-game
multinational model, to simulate contagion between linked
markets in the presence of noise traders. Further, we provide
evidence on financial contagion using real data for the Asian
countries.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes
the framework for the mixed-game multinational model. In
Section III, we introduce an approach to parameter estima-
tion. The simulations results are summarised in Section IV.
Finally, in Section V we provide some concluding remarks.
II. MIXED-GAME MULTINATIONAL MODEL
A. Minority Game
The mixed-game model [15][16] and the mixed-game
multinational model [11] are both extensions of the minority
game model [12]. Challet and Zhang [12] used minority
game to solve initially the El-Farol bar problem [17], and
then extended the application to modelling market behaviour
of heterogeneous agents. Currently, minority game is be-
coming a very influential approach in behavioural studies
[14][18].
The basic minority game structure involves an odd number
of players N , each of whom has to choose an action, buy or
sell, in every time period. The actions are denoted as +1 for
buy and −1 for sell. The information available to an agent
at any time t, is the string µ = (χt−1, ..., χt−M ) of the
last M actions on the winning side. The winning side is the
minority side, χ ∈ {−1,+1}, and M is an agent’s memory
size. There are 2M possible strings µt = µt,1...µt,2M , and
the string corresponding to the last M actions on the winning
side is called present history. For each possible history µt, a
strategy recommends a fixed action αµt±,i. Each agent has a
decision table of K strategies, therefore all strategies on the
market can be denoted with Sj,i, j = 1...K, i = 1...N . Table
I illustrates an agent’s decision table for M = 3,K = 2.
TABLE I
EXEMPLARY DECISION TABLE OF THE AGENT i FOR M = 3,K = 2
µt S1,i S2,i
−1,−1,−1 −1 +1
−1,−1,+1 +1 −1
−1,+1,−1 −1 +1
−1,+1,+1 +1 +1
+1,−1,−1 −1 −1
+1,−1,+1 −1 +1
+1,+1,−1 −1 +1
+1,+1,+1 +1 −1
Each strategy can collect a virtual point if its predicted
action is on the winning side. The number of virtual points
of strategy Sj,i over a horizon till period t is denoted as
U jit. The sum of virtual points for all strategies of agent i
predicting action buy at t is U (+)i,t , and by analogy for sell and
U
(−)
i,t . Therefore, the difference of virtual points for the two
actions of agent i at time t is ∆i,t ≡ U (+)i,t −U (−)i,t . His choice
is given by a strategy Sj,i, j = 1...K, with the highest virtual
points among the strategies matching the sign of sgn(∆i,t).
That will be the strategy of agent i at time t, and we will
denote it as Sti . Summarizing the actions of the population
of agents choosing the + sign, buy, and the − sign, sell, at
time t, we get the excess demand At = (αµ1+α
µ
2+ ...+α
µ
N ).
The minority side wins the game, therefore the sign chosen
by the minority at time t is χt = −sgn(At). Thus the new
history string µt+1 = (χt, ..., χt−M+1) is built up.
B. Mixed-game and Mixed-game Multinational Model
The standard minority game is further modified by Gou
[15][16] to develop a mixed-game model that better simulates
financial markets. In a mixed-game model, odd number of
participants N are divided into two groups playing a majority
game and a minority game, respectively. N1 is the number
of agents playing the majority game, and N2 is the number
of agents playing the minority game. Let M1 and M2 denote
the memory size of majority and minority game players,
accordingly; while K1 and K2 denote the size of the strategy
table for majority and minority game players. A player in the
majority game has approaches to taking actions analogous to
a player in the minority game. However, a majority player
wins if his action is on the majority side. Therefore, the sign
chosen by a majority player at time t is χt = sgn(At).
Furthermore, agents collect virtual points for their strategies
over some time windows, T1 for majority players and T2
for minority players. The price Pt in period t depends on the
excess demand, as in (1)
Pt = δ
N∑
i=1
αµtSi + Pt−1 (1)
where parameter δ is a scale factor.
We extend the mixed-game model to work with two or
more markets. This is referred to as a mixed-game multina-
tional model. In this advanced model, there are two markets
A and B, players in market A only invest in market A,
but take actions taking into account both markets A and B.
Vice versa for players in market B only invest in market B,
but take actions based on both markets B and A. Thus for
players in market A, the actions depending on the historical
string for market A, µAt at time t, are denoted with α
µAt
±,i, i =
1...NA, and the actions depending on the historical string for
market B, µBt , are α
µBt
±,i, i = 1...NA. Analogous notations
can be introduced for the actions of players in market B.
Therefore an agent faces different possible actions depending
on information from corresponding different markets.
Let us consider market A. We assign each player a
parameter ωAi,t, i = 1...NA, so that the probability of agent i
in market A to choose in period t an action, piAi,t, based on
the domestic market is in (2)
piAi,t =
exp(λAωAi,t)
exp(λAωAi,t) + exp(−λAωAi,t)
(2)
Where λA is a scale factor. Agents will take action based
on either domestic market or foreign market. Thus the
probability of an agent choosing an action based on a foreign
market is 1− piAi,t. Parameter ωAi,t is updated after each turn.
If the actions based on the domestic market history, µAt ,
win the game, and the actions based on the foreign market
history, µBt , loose the game, then ωAi,t+1 = ωAi,t + 1. If the
actions based on the foreign market history µBt win, and the
actions based on the domestic market history µAt loose, then
ωAi,t+1 = ω
A
i,t− 1. Therefore, if and only if αµ
A
t
±,i 6= αµ
B
t
±,i, the
parameters ωAi are updated.
Players in market B behave in the same way.
C. Noise Traders
Next, we introduce a proportion of noise traders in each
market. NA,noise and NB,noise denote the number of noise-
trader agents, in the two markets respectively. In our model,
noise traders have a tendency to follow the sign of the last
price change on the markets. For example in market A, the
probability piAn,t of noise traders to take a buy action (+1) is
in (3):
piAn,t =
exp(ζAt−1)
exp(ζAt−1) + exp(−ζAt−1)
(3)
Where
ζAt−1 =
Z∑
Z=1
(
PZt−1 − PZt−2
PZt−2
)τA (4)
and Z ∈ {marketA,marketB,marketC,marketD, ...}
for the multinational model involving K markets. PZt is the
price in market Z at time t . Parameter τA manages the
sensitivity of noise traders in market A to changes in market
Z. Finally, the probability of noise traders in market A to
choose a sell action is 1− piAn,t.
Let us further analyse (2) and (3). They seem similar, and
a feature of this type of equations is that in an equilibrium
state ωAi,t = 0 or ζ
A
t−1 = 0, e.g. at the very beginning, agents
have the same probability to take one or the other of the two
possible actions. If the action based on the historical string
from the domestic market wins the game and the other one
based on foreign market loses, then ωAi,t will be updated from
ωAi,t = 0 to ω
A
i,t > 0, thus the probability of taking the action
based on domestic market increases. Equally, if the sum of
relative changes from all related markets are positive ζAt−1 >
0, then the probability of noise traders selecting “buy” is
larger than selecting “sell”, and vice versa. Factors λA and
τA are employed to adjust the speed of the probability getting
close to 100% and 0%. In Fig. 1, we plot (2) for a variety
of scale factors λA.
Fig. 1. Calculated probability pi using formula (2) and varying the scale
factor λ. The line represents λ = 1, the square corresponds to λ = 0.2,
and the diamond stands for λ = 0.1, while the dot is λ = 0.05 and the
triangle is λ = 0.01
It is obvious that the probability approaches 100% and
0% more slowly when the scale factor decreases. Therefore,
scale factors λz , Z ∈ {A,B,C,D, ...}, can be used to
describe different markets. By analogy, scale factors τZ ,
Z ∈ {A,B,C,D, ...}, are used to describe the sensitivity
to different markets.
III. PARAMETERS ESTIMATION
The objective of the mixed-game multinational model is
to simulate the effects of the crisis on the markets hit by the
shock. We adopt an appropriate procedure to estimate the
relevant parameters. For this purpose, the following issues
need to be considered [15][16]:
1) the memory size of both types of game players must be
larger than 2, and the memory size of majority game
players should be less than that of minority players,
while the time window for majority game players can
not be larger than for minority players.
2) the plots of return distributions should look similar;
3) following the standard by Gou [15] [16], the median
of the local volatilities of simulation results should be
similar to the target real market;
4) co-movements with market from which the crisis orig-
inated should be look similar.
Following these restrictions, first the general parameters
for market participants are determined. These parameters
include M1, M2, K1, K2, T1, T2, and N (total number
of participants only, not distinguishing between N1, N2 and
Nnoise, i.e.N = N1 + N2 + Nnoise). We have tested for
parameters robustness, and confirmed the conclusion in Gou
[16] that changes in M , K, T or N contribute little to the
simulation of a financial market. In the next section, we will
simulate the movement of the stock markets in South Korea
and Hong Kong during the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
Beside the above parameters, we need values for the
remaining parameters to be able to simulated heterogeneous
markets. The additional parameters include the proportions
of N1, N2, Nnoise in the total number of participants N ,
as well as the scale factor δ in (1) and the sensitivity factor
τ in (4). In contrast to the general parameters, these specific
parameters affect significantly daily return distributions in
the simulated markets.
Empirical studies of price fluctuation for various financial
assets have shown that the stock return distributions deviate
from the Gaussian distribution and are characterised with
fat tails [19][20]. Indeed, inappropriate proportions of N1,
N2 and Nnoise will lead to ridiculous return distributions.
Fig. 2 plots kurtosis in grid as the result generated through
simulations under different values for N1, N2, and Nnoise.
We assume an extreme scenario where noise traders sensi-
tivity factor τ = 0, i.e. noise traders have equal probability
to “buy” or “sell”. Indeed, noise traders are trend followers,
and they will increase the kurtosis of return distributions.
We observe in Fig. 2 that some proportions for N1, N2, and
Nnoise result in extremely large kurtosis. In real markets,
particularly near 1000 days return, the kurtosis is under 10.
For example, kurtosis of the stock market of South Korea
for the relative stable period from 03/01/1994 to 01/07/1997
is 4.13. Kurtosis of the stock market of Hong Kong in
the same period is 6.20 (see Fig. 3). Fig. 2 also indicates
that simulations under some values are unstable. Thus, we
choose appropriate values for N1, N2 and Nnoise, such
that the corresponding simulations are stable and the return
distributions are plausible.
Furthermore, owing to the different index and trading
volume in each market, we need to adjust the factor δ in
(2) to assure that the median of local volatilities is similar to
the target real market. For the purpose of more precisely
simulating the movement of the target real market, it is
recommended to use return distributions and median of local
volatilities collected over a longer horizon.
Based on the definition of [1][2], financial contagion
occurs when the correlation between the original market
and the affected market increases significantly from a period
Fig. 2. Kurtosis in grid simulated under varying proportions for N1, N2
and Nnoise . N = 201 is a constant and N = N1 + N2 + Nnoise.
Other parameter setting is τ = 0 and δ = 2. The results are averaged over
100 trials, where each trial has 50 repetitions of mixed-game multinational
model, and each repetition simulated 912 days movement.
Fig. 3. Plots of daily returns distributions of South Korea and Hong Kong
stock markets from 03/01/1994 to 01/07/1997, 912 days. The kurtosis of
South Korea is 4.13 and of Hong Kong is 6.20
of relative stability to a period of crisis. Otherwise, the
phenomenon is defined as interdependence. For example,
the period from 25/02/1997 to 31/12/1997 can be divided
into two equal phases around the beginning of the Asian
crisis. The first period corresponds to the pre-crisis phase,
and the second period corresponds to the crisis phase. Let
us consider the correlation coefficient between the country
from which the crisis originated, i.e. Thailand, and one of
the affected markets, South Korea. The correlation during
the pre-crisis phase is −0.64, while during the crisis phase
it is 0.92 (see Fig. 4). This confirms the expectation of
a significant increase in the co-movement of markets. In
order to simulate contagion, we need to identify properly
the sensitivity parameter.
IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
We apply the parameters estimation procedure outlined
above for the mixed-game multinational model then used
Fig. 4. Indices of Thailand’s and South Korea’s stock market, from
25/02/1997 to 31/12/1997. The line corresponds to the crisis origin, Thai-
land, and the dash represents an affected market, South Korea. The left side
corresponds to the pre-crisis phase, and the right side represents the crisis
phase. The correlation coefficient is −0.64 prior to the crisis, and 0.92
during the crisis phase.
to simulate the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The crisis
originated in Thailand (TH), and affected markets are South
Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asian
countries. We simulate the markets in South Korea (SK) and
Hong Kong (HK) as target real markets over 222 trading
days, 25/02/1997-31/12/1997, in relation to the movement
of Thailand’s stock market. We collect the target daily
return distributions and the median of local volatilities, using
historical index movements over the period 03/01/1994-
01/07/1997, corresponding to 912 trading days. The target
correlation coefficients of real markets are collected from
historical index movements over 25/02/1997-31/12/1997 or
222 trading days. The first 111 days correspond to the pre-
crisis phase, and the last 111 days represent the crisis phase.
The target real market values are listed in Table II. Based on
these, the parameters for simulating target markets are listed
in Table III.
TABLE II
TARGET VALUES OF REAL STOCK MARKETS
Target Value South Korea Hong Kong
Kurtosis of daily return distribution 4.13 6.20
Median of local volatility 63.47 9283.13
Correlation coefficient in pre-crisis phase -0.64 -0.52
Correlation coefficient in crisis phase 0.92 0.86
Fig. 5 shows the kurtosis of daily returns and the median
of local volatilities over 912 days, from a simulation under
the parameters values given in Table III. Kurtosis of SK
simulation is 4.6, while the corresponding value for the HK
simulation is 5.6. Fig. 6 presents the SK simulation of daily
returns and median of local volatilities over 912 days, under
the parameter values in Table III. The simulated SK median
is 59.43. Fig. 7 represents the HK simulation of daily returns
and median of volatilities, where the simulated median is
TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS BASED ON TARGET VALUES IN TABLE II
Parameter Symbol South Korea Hong Kong
N 201 201
M1 3 3
M2 6 6
K1 4 4
K2 6 6
T1 12 12
T2 60 60
N1 25 28
N2 151 131
Nnoise 25 42
δ 2.2 0.2
τ 30 40
8962.76.
Fig. 5. Plots of daily return distributions from a simulation of SK and HK
over 912 days. The simulated kurtosis for SK is 4.6, while it is 5.6 for HK.
The simulation parameters are based on Table III.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows the movements in the market where
the crisis originated(top), the real index in the SK affected
market (middle), and the simulated SK index (bottom), from
25/02/1997 to 31/12/1997 or 222 trading days. The crisis
phase is on the right-hand side, while the pre-crisis phase is
on the left. The correlation coefficient of the simulated SK
series and the crisis origin (TH) real series is 0.63 in pre-
crisis phase, and rises to 0.94 during the crisis phase. Fig. 9
presents the corresponding information for the HK market.
The correlation coefficient of the simulated HK series and the
crisis origin (TH) real series is 0.48 in the pre-crisis phase,
and rises to 0.96 during the crisis.
During the pre-crisis phase, Thailand suffers an initial
tumble and manages to recover, while SK and HK do not
follow that tumble and their markets are unaffected. In our
model, SK and HK will be affected to a degree, through
the noise traders. However, both the real and simulated
correlation coefficients of the affected markets in the pre-
crisis phase are within the range of correlation coefficients
in relatively stable or non-crisis periods. Furthermore, the
simulated results approximate well the target real markets
Fig. 6. The top plot corresponds to the volatilities from the real SK index.
The bottom plot represents and a simulation over 912 trading days. The
median of local volatilities for the real index is 63.47, and the simulated
median is 59.43
Fig. 7. The top plot corresponds to the volatilities from the real HK index.
The bottom plot represents and a simulation over 912 trading days. The
median of local volatilities for the real index is 9282.13, and the simulated
median is 8962.76.
Fig. 8. Real index movement in the contagion-origin market of TH (top),
real SK market (middle), and a simulated SK market (bottom) based on the
parameters in Table III. Period 25/02/1997-31/12/1997.
Fig. 9. Real index movement in the contagion-origin market of TH (top),
real HK market (middle), and a simulated HK market (bottom) based on
the parameters in Table III. Period 25/02/1997-31/12/1997.
movements and the correlation with the crisis-origin, during
the crisis phase. In particular, both the real and simulated
correlation coefficients rise significantly during the crisis
period.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed a mixed-game multi-
national model with the purpose of simulating contagion
occurring during financial crises. The aim is to capture
characteristics of linked financial markets contributing to
financial contagion. Using real data for Thailand, where
the Asian crisis of 1997 originated, and simulating the
movements of the affected markets of South Korea and Hong
Kong, we detect some important features. These include
fat-tail return distributions, and similarity between real and
simulated volatility. We find a significant increase in the
correlation and co-movement between markets during the
crisis phase.
Future research will also consider evolutionary games to
shed further light on financial contagion using simulation
techniques. The investigation of market characteristics lead-
ing to financial contagion will contribute to recognising at
an earlier stage financial crises that potentially destabilise
cross-market linkages. Such information would be extremely
valuable to develop appropriate risk management strategies.
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